The article explores why dictators purge certain elites in specific ways and not others. It suggests that dictators are more likely to purge first-generation elites and imprison them to avoid retaliation from other elites or the purged elite themselves. The study is based on novel data on autocratic elites in 16 regimes from 1922 to 2020.

The article's contribution to research on authoritarian survival is threefold. First, it integrates the analysis of how dictators manage individuals with research on autocratic elite management, which usually focuses on whether individuals are promoted, shuffled, or removed. Second, the article suggests that dictators are strategic in their use of violence against regime elites and are precise in using violence against their supporters to avoid negative repercussions. Third, the article uses innovative data on autocratic elites to expose the secretive inner workings of dictatorships and shows how dictators manipulate the internal balance of power to survive in office. This contribution adds to a growing literature on the topic and further deepens our understanding of how authoritarian regimes operate.

Goldring, Edward and Austin S. Matthews. “To Purge or Not to Purge? An Individual-Level Quantitative Analysis of Elite Purges in Dictatorships.” British Journal of Political Science 53, no. 2 (2023): 575–93.